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INTRODUCTION
At the core of any defamation t action, balanced against the twin First
Amendment2 interests of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, lies the
state interest in compensating plaintiffs for harm to reputation? While damages
for both emotional suffering 4 and pecuniary losses such as lost income and outof-pocket expenses5 are allowed in suits for libel6 and slander,7 reputational harm

1. The term defamation generally encompasses both the torts of libel and slander. W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § I1, at 771 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KETON]. See, e.g., CAL. CirV. CODE § 44 (West 1982) (providing that defamation is effected by either libel or
slander). The four basic elements of a cause of action for defamation include: (1) a false and defamatory
statement concerning another, (2) the unprivileged publication of that statement to at least one third party; (3)
fault; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
2.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. U.S. CoNST. amend. 1. The Free Speech and
Free Press Clauses of the First Amendment have been incorporated to apply to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,34849 (1974) (providing that states have a "strong
and legitimate ...interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation" that is balanced against
First Amendment interests).
4.
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (stating that the customary types of damages for harm inflicted by a
defamatory falsehood include "mental anguish and suffering"); see, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 48(4)(a) (West
1982) (providing, in part, that general damages in defamation actions under California law include
compensation for "shame, mortification and hurt feelings"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623
(1977) (providing that damages for emotional distress may be awarded in suits for libel and slander).
5. Economic losses recoverable in defamation actions are sometimes referred to as special damages.
Robert D. Sack, Common Law Libel and the Press:A Primer,in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1993, at 35, 123-24
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-372) [hereinafter
Sack, Common Law Libel]; see, e.g., Gertz. 418 U.S. at 350 (stating that actual injury compensable in
defamation actions includes, but is not limited to, "out-of-pocket loss"); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(4)(b) (West
1982) (stating in relevant part that "special damages" in defamation actions under California law include
damages suffered in respect to one's property, business, trade, profession, or occupation).
6.
Libel is generally the written, pictorial, or broadcast form of defamation. Sack, Common Law Libel,
supra note 5, at 41. Libel consists of"the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its
embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities
characteristic of written or printed words." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 568 (1977); see RESTATMENT
(SECOND) OFTORTS § 568A (1977) (providing that "[b]roadcasting of defamatory matter by means of radio or
television is libel, whether or not it is read from a manuscript"). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 46 (West 1982)
(stating that slander includes defamation by "radio or any mechanical or other means").
7.
Slander traditionally is considered the oral or spoken form of defamation. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 112, at 785; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(2) (1977) (providing that slander
consists of the publication of defamatory matter by "spoken words" and "transitory gestures").
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is the central injury elements of these two "dignitary torts." 9 In the words of the
United States Supreme Court, "damage to reputation is... the essence of libel."' 0
More recently, the first jury in the libel case of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc." was bluntly admonished that "the interest of the plaintiff in a defamation
2
suit is his reputation."'
Evaluating harm to reputation, and the concomitant task of awarding general
damages 3 for such injury, however, are not easy tasks for jurors in libel trials.
The difficulties in measuring harm to reputation represent one justification for the
common-law doctrine of presumed damages that allows damages to be awarded
for reputational injury without any proof of harm. 4 Described by the United
States Supreme Court as an "oddity of tort law,"' 5 the doctrine of presumed
damages has been repeatedly criticized.'6
Part of the problem in measuring reputational harm is the very nature of the
injury-one literally cannot hear, see, or touch a reputation. While special

damages 7 for reputational harm may be based on proof of lost income or profit
subsequent to the communication of a defamatory message, general damages for

reputational harm-those designed, in part, to compensate for the intangible, nonpecuniary harm caused by a defamatory message-are more speculative. As

8.
See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Kan. 1982) (providing that "damage
to one's reputation is the essence and gravaman of an action for defamation").
9.
See Terrance C. Mead, Suing MediaforEmotional Distress:A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law
Evolution, 23 WASHBUN L.J. 24, 29 (1983) (classifying torts that focus on the protection of personality, such
as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as "dignitary torts").
10. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,275 (1971).
11. 832 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
12. Jury Instructions at 37, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(C-84-7545 EFL).
13. Sack, Common Law Libel, supranote 5, at 41; see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 621 cmt.
a (1977) (providing that in "defamation actions general damages are imposed for the purpose of compensating
the plaintiff for harm that the publication has caused to his reputation," distinguishing general damages from
damages for "special harm," and defining special harm as "the loss of something having economic or pecuniary
value"); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(4)(a) (West 1982) (defining general damages as "damages for loss of
reputation, shame, mortification and hurt feelings").
14. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749,760-61 (1985) (explaining
that the rationale behind the common-law rule of presumed damages is that it has been the experience and
judgment of history that proving actual damage may be impossible in many cases even though it is all but
certain that harm has in fact occurred).
15. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). In Gertz, the Court restricted the recovery
of presumed damages, when speech is of public concern, to situations in which a plaintiff can establish actual
malice. Id. Actual malice, a fault standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is defined as the publication of a defamatory statement with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether the statement is true or false. Id. at 279-80.
16. See generally David A. Anderson, PresumedHann: An Item for the UnfinishedAgenda of Times
v. Sullivan, 62 JOURNALISM Q. 24 (1985); David A. Anderson, Defamation and the FirstAmendment: New
Perspectives:Reputation, Compensation,and Proof,25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 747 (1984).

17. Special damages are typically designed to compensate for pecuniary harm, such as lost wages and
out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of defamatory speech. CAL. Civ. CODE § 48(4)(b) (West 1982).
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Dobbs notes, general damages for reputational harm "often represent a reasonable
guess, or at least some kind of guess, that actual damages have been sustained."' 8
The difficulty in evaluating harm to reputation was vividly called to the
attention of the legal community in the 1993 trial in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc. 9 In the first trial in that case, the jury agreed that the plaintiff had
suffered some reputational harm, but deadlocked on the issue of monetary
damages, unable to agree on the extent of reputational harm sustained by the
plaintiff.20 Some jurors reportedly thought that the plaintiff had sustained more
than $1 million of reputational harm, while others, apparently believing Masson
had sustained de minimis reputational damage, were willing to award him only
the nominal sum of $1.2' As one Massonjuror succinctly summarized the problem, "putting a dollar amount on what a damaged reputation is, is very, very

hard." 22 Jury instructions may compound the problem that jurors face, offering
little practical guidance when it comes to awarding general damages for reputational harm.23
The legal concepts of reputation 24 and reputational harm 25 currently attract the
attention of a number of scholars in the field of communication research. Harm
to reputation has become "fertile new ground for both constitutional analysis and
social science research., 26 The issue of reputational harm falls under what communication scholars call a message effects question.2 7 The issue is whether a

18. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OFREMEDIES § 7.2, at 513 (1973). More recently, Sack
and Baron, in their 1994 treatise on defamation, state that "[d]amage issues in tort law provide knotty problems.
In the law of defamation, the knots are Gordian." ROBERTD. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS 481 (2d ed. 1994).
19. 832 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
20. Masson, 832 F. Supp. at 1354.
21. Ben Wildavsky, Some Jurors Wanted to Give Masson $1, S.F. CHRON., June 5, 1993, at Al.
22. Id.
23. According to studies conducted by the Libel Defense Resource Center, libel jurors "almost
unanimously yearned for increased guida'nce, particularly as to damages. In the absence of adequate
instructions from the bench, the jurors appeared to determine damages with little or no rational basis." Robert
L Raskopf, Jury Instructionson DamagesIssues, LIBEL DEF. REsOURcE CENTER BULL., July 31, 1994, at 59,
60; see DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.2, at 514 (1973) (stating that no fixed
standard can be imposed for the measurement of intangible injuries such as lowering one in the estimation of
the community, and that the award "is peculiarly in the province of the jury, subject to review for
excessiveness"). See generally Cal. BAI No. 7.10 (1992 Rev.) (West 1994 Supp.) (setting forth the model jury
instruction for general damages in libel and slander actions in California).
24. See infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of reputation).
25. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussing how harm to reputation is manifested in
defamation cases, generally by opinion change or behavioral change).
26. David McCraw, How Do ReadersRead? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 CATH. U. L. REV.

81, 82 (1991).
27. See generally MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (Jennings Bryant & Dolf
Zillmann eds., 1994) (describing communication effects research in a number of different areas such as media
violence and sexually explicit speech); see also generally JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL
RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION AND LAW (1990) (providing a comprehensive review of then existing
communication research on message effects assumptions embedded in the law and suggesting a paradigm for
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defamatory message, communicated by a defendant (the message source), causes
a change in the opinion or behavior of the receiver (the audience) of that message
about the plaintiff.

An immense body of social science research and theory on attitude and
behavior change caused by messages has accumulated during the past forty

years. 2 Communication scholars now question assumptions about the communication processes embedded in modem libel law, including assumptions about
reputational injury.29 Research and theory in communication point to several
concepts and variables that may mitigate, enhance, or otherwise influence the
extent of reputational harm caused by a defamatory message ° Ultimately these

concepts may facilitate jurors in evaluating personal reputational harm. This31

article illustrates one example of communication research on reputational harm,
and offers an introduction to research, from a communication perspective, on the
legal issue of harm to reputation.
Following an interdisciplinary tack that bridges the disciplines of libel law
and communication science, this article presents the results of an experiment
designed to assess whether a denial of defamatory allegations-specifically, a
denial published within the same article containing those defamatory allegations-may reduce the net harm to reputation. 32 In particular, two common forms
of denial-a brief, one-sentence statement (BriefDenial)and a lengthy, repeated
statement of denial (RepeatedDenial)--wereevaluated for their effectiveness in
reducing the defamatory impact of libelous statements. The extent of reputational

future interdisciplinary research on legal questions involving message effects issues).
28. See generally RICHARD E. PErrY &JOHNT. CACIOPPO, ATrrrUDES AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AN)
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (1981) (providing an overview and primer on attitude, opinion, and persuasion
research).
29. See generally Jeremy Cohen & Albert C. Gunther, Libel as Communication Phenomena, 9 COMM.
& LAw (Oct. 1987) 9, 23-30 (arguing that a number of variables and factors for which the law does not
currently account may influence harm to reputation caused by a defamatory statement).
30. Id. at 28 (providing a laundry list of communication variables that may influence harm to reputation,
including source credibility, involvement, and message repetition).
31. For examples of other communication experiments on the issue of harm to reputation, see Jeremy
Cohen et al., PerceivedImpact of Defamation: An Experiment on Third-PersonEffects, 52 PUB. OPINION Q.
161 (1988) (presenting an experiment on the impact that the "third-person effect" may have on estimations of
reputational harm); Jeremy Cohen. et al., Experimental Test of Some Notions of the Fact/OpinionDistinction
in Libel, 66 JouRNAusM Q. 11 (1989) (presenting an experiment about whether readers perceive more
reputational harm being caused by statements of fact or statements of opinion). For a brief introduction to the
relationship of communication approaches to studying legal issues, see Jeremy Cohen, Degrees of Freedom:
Parametersof Communication Law Research, 8 COMM. & LAW, 11, 11-12 (Aug. 1986). For a theoretical
perspective on reputational harm, see Clay Calvert, Reputation and Public Opinion Process: Reconciling Libel
Law with Communication Science (unpublished paper presented to the Law Division of the Association for
Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, August 10, 1994, Atlanta, GA) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal).
32. See infra Part III (describing the experiment on denial of defamatory allegations, including an

overview of the experiment and a detailed description of the hypotheses, subjects, procedures, statistical tests,
and results).
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harm caused by these two versions (BriefDenial and Repeated Denial) of a
realistic-appearing, simulated newspaper article was compared with that caused
by a third version of the same article that was identical in all respects to the first
two versions, except that it contained no denial of the defamatory statements (a
No Denial version).
The findings of the experiment suggest that a statement of Denial-in
particular, a repeatedstatement of denial-may significantly mitigate or reduce
the extent of harm to reputation caused by defamatory statements. As compared
to the No Denial version of the article, the Repeated Denial version of the
defamatory article caused significantly less reputational harm. Clearly, one
experiment cannot hope to answer, solve, or address all questions about the impact of a denial of libelous statements on reputational harm. This article, and the
experiment that it describes, makes no pretense of resolving this complex issue.
Rather, it attempts to illustrate the potential value that exists in studying the issue

of reputational injury from an interdisciplinary approach. It further offers the first
step of a potential research agenda on the issue of denial of defamatory statements.
Furthermore, as addressed below, the issue of whether the self-help remedy
of a denial of defamatory allegations mitigates reputational harm is ripe for
examination. The United States Supreme Court's dichotomy between public
official/public figure and private figure libel plaintiffs rests, in part, on the
3
assumption that a denial is effective in reducing reputational harm?
Part I of this article presents an overview of the concepts of reputation and
reputational harm. 34 Part II then presents a brief review of, and introduction to,
communication research and theory on reputational harm, and provides an
example of source credibility as one variable identified by communication
research that may influence the amount of harm to reputation caused by a
defamatory message.35 Part III describes an experiment conducted on the impact
of a denial of libelous allegations on reputational harm, including a presentation
36
of its theoretical underpinnings, research methods, statistical tests, and results.
The article concludes with a discussion of the results of the experiment, and suggests that future communication research on reputational harm may ultimately aid
jurors in libel trials.37

33. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing the legal assumptions about the impact
of a statement of denial on harm to reputation).

34. See infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.

35. See infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
36.

See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.

37.

See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
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I. REPUTATION AND REPUTATIONAL HARM
This part initially explicates the concepts of reputation and reputational
harm.3 8 It then briefly explores some legal assumptions regarding the impact of
denial on reputational harm.39 Finally, this part describes one current libel reform
effort-the Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act (hereinafter
UCCDA)-that deals with the problem of reputational harm in a decidedly pro-

defendant fashion.40
A. Defining Reputation and ReputationalHarm
Robert Post, in a thoughtful explication of the legal concept of reputation,
observes that reputation "is a mysterious thing." 41 Lamenting that attempts to'pin
down the meaning of reputation are few and far between, Post articulates three
constituent concepts, or interests, within the meaning of reputation, including
property, honor, and dignity.42 Post, however, fails to arrive at a single, agreedupon legal definition of reputation. Indeed, pinning down a definition of reputation is a difficult task.
At the nominal level of meaning, a reputation is simply an intangible
interest-it is something that a person has, builds, risks, uses, and, sometimes,
throws away. In particular, for purposes of libel law, it is something that a defamatory statement is alleged to harm, reduce, or destroy. While a reputation cannot
literally be seen or touched, some people are said to possess "good" ones while
others are disparaged for having "bad" ones.
While there may be no clear legal definition of reputation or reputational
harm, one can distill, from an analysis of the works of legal commentators, case
law, and state statutes, two basic ways in which reputational harm is manifested:
(1) attitude and opinion change, in the negative direction, toward the plaintiff; and
(2) physical or behavioral change, also in the negative direction, toward the
plaintiff.
1.

ReputationalHarm asAttitude and Opinion Change

Harm to reputation allegedly caused by a defamatory statement may be manifested in the opinion changes, in the negative direction, of others toward the
plaintiff. For instance, Prosser and Keeton state that "[d]efamation is rather that

38. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
41. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74
CAL. L. REV. 691, 692 (1986).
42. Id. at 692-93.
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which tends to injure 'reputation' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem,
respect, good will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite
adverse, derogatory, or unpleasantfeelings or opinionsagainst him. 43 They state
that defamation "involves the opinion which others in the community may have,

or teid to have, of the plaintiff.'

'

Likewise, the drafters of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts indicate that to harm one's reputation means, in part, to "lower
[the plaintiff] in the estimation ofthe community."45 California Civil Code section
45,46 which sets forth that state's definition of libel, provides, in part, that injury
' 47
occurs when a person is exposed to "hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy.
Each of these concepts manifests itself in the expression of an opinion about the
plaintiff. Case law from other states also suggests that harm to reputation may be
manifested in attitude and opinion-particularly community opinion-changes
about the plaintiff.4 Finally, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,49 the United States
Supreme Court linked "impairment of reputation and standing in the
community"50 as among the customary types of harm inflicted by defamatory
falsehoods.
In summary, these examples illustrate that harm to reputation is, in part,
equated with attitude and opinion change about the plaintiff in the negative
direction. This is crucial, in part, because the experiment described later in this
article operationalizes the concept of reputational harm in terms of opinion
change.
2. ReputationalHarm as BehavioralChange
While reputational harm may take the form of negative attitudes and
opinions, it also includes changes in physical conduct or behavior toward the
plaintiff. In addition to defining reputational harm in terms of lowering one in the
sphere of community opinion, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

43.

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 11I, at 773 (emphasis added).

44. Id. § 111, at771 (emphasis added).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS § 559 (1977) (emphasis added).
46. CAL. CV. CODE § 45 (West 1982). The statute provides that "[I]ibel is a false and unprivileged
publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has
a tendency to injure him in his occupation." Id.

47. Id.
48. See generally Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1985), reh'g
denied, 783 F.2d 205 (1Ith Cir. 1986) (providing that under Florida law a statement may be defamatory if it
"tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt or disgrace"); Green v. Northern Publishing Co.,
Inc., 655 P.2d 736, 739 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983) (providing that in Alaska a
communication is defamatory, in part, if it tends to harm the reputation of another "so as to lower him in the
estimation of the community").
49. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
50. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
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also provide that to harm one's reputation means "to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him." 51 In other words, a physical behavioral change
toward the plaintiff-refraining from associating with the plaintiff-is an
indicator of reputational harm. Likewise, California Civil Code section 45 takes
such a hybrid approach to defining reputational harm, combining opinion and
behavioral indicators of the injury. It provides that while harm to reputation may
take the form of exposing one to hatred, contempt, and ridicule, libelous harm
also occurs when the plaintiff is "shunned or avoided" by others 5 2

In summary, while reputation and reputational harm may be slippery concepts, the manifestations of harm to reputation may be observed in the attitudes,
opinions, and behaviors of others toward the plaintiff. Because attitude and
opinion change are subjects frequently studied in the discipline of communica-

tion, the issue of harm to reputation readily lends itself to study from a communication perspective.
B. Legal Assumptions About Denialof Defamatory Statements
The experiment described in this article focuses on the impact, on reputational harm, of statements that deny defamatory allegations. This topic is relevant
from a legal perspective, in addition to a communication research perspective,
because the United States Supreme Court assumes that a denial of defamatory
allegations may be effective in mitigating reputational harm. 3 The Supreme
Court has accorded more protection to media defendants in libel actions when the

51. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 559 (1977).
52. CAL. CIv. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
53. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. In Gertz, the Court stated:
[W]e have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any
victim of defamation is self-help--using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the
error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures

enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a
more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.
Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest inprotecting them

is correspondingly greater.

Id.
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plaintiff is a public official' or public figureS -- as opposed to a private
figure5--precisely because public individuals7 are deemed to have greater access
to the media to deny defamatory allegations
The Supreme Court stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 8 that "the first
remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help--using available opportunities
to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby minimize its adverse impact
on reputation."5 9 Underlying this statement is the assumption that a denial of
defamatory allegations may, as the Supreme Court put it, "minimize... adverse
impact on reputation. ' "
While the Supreme Court assumes that a denial of defamatory allegations

intended to contradict the lie may minimize reputational harm, this assumption
has never been empirically examined. The issue is whether, in fact, the self-help
remedy of contradicting an error, by means of a statement of denial, actually mitigates harm to reputation. While the experiment set forth in Part III only examines

one limited form of denial, it represents the first step in testing the Court's

assumption.

54. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-86 (1966) (stating that the designation of public official
"applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs" and defining
public officials, for purposes of libel law, as those officials of such apparent importance that the public is
independently interested in their qualifications and performance, beyond the general public interest in the
qualifications and performance of all government employees); James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 17 Cal.
App. 4th 1, 10, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890, 895 (Cal. 6th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (providing a list of four factors that
state courts in California apply to determine whether a government employee is a public official for purposes
of libel law); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 580A cmt. b (1977) (describing who constitutes
a public official).
55. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (defining two classes of public figures, including all-purpose public
figures, who achieve such pervasive fame and notoriety that they are deemed public figures in all cases, and
limited-purpose public figures, who voluntarily inject themselves into, or who are drawn into, a particular
public controversy).
56. See id. at 345 (defining private figures as individuals who have not accepted public office, assumed
an "influential role in ordering society," or relinquished any part of the interest in the protection of their
names).
57. Unlike public official and public figure plaintiffs in defamation actions, private figure plaintiffs do
not need to prove actual malice on the part of the defendant or defendants to recover for actual injury when the
statement at issue is of public concern. Gertz,418 U.S. at 348. The Court reasoned in Gertz that private figure
plaintiffs have less access to media channels of communication to contradict errors or lies about their
reputations than do either public officials or public figures. Id. at 344. Actual malice, a fault standard
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is
defined as the publication of a statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether
the statement is true or false. Id. at 279-80. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A (1977)

(defining the fault standard in libel actions applicable to public official and public figure libel plaintiffs).
58. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
59. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
60. Id.
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C. The Uniform Correctionor Clarificationof DefamationAct
One proposal to reform the tangled web of libel law that has recently gained
momentum is the Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act
(UCCDA). 61 The UCCDA, however, deals with the issue of general harm to reputation in a decidedly pro-defendant manner.
The UCCDA was formally adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law in August, 1993,62 and subsequently was accepted
by the American Bar Association's House of Delegates in February, 1994.63 The
UCCDA provides in relevant part that if a potential libel plaintiff falls to demand,
in good faith, a correction or clarification of the allegedly libelous statement or
statements within ninety days after knowledge of publication--or if the publisher
runs a sufficient correction or clarification once such a demand has been
made-then the plaintiff is limited to recovering damages for provable economic
loss, such as lost wages or out-of-pocket expenses.6 Recovery for all other forms
of damages-including general and reputational damages-is barred if the
plaintiff fails to ask for a correction or clarification within ninety days after
knowledge of publication or if the publisher prints such a correction or clarifica-

tion. The UCCDA thus disposes of the difficulty of evaluating general reputational harm by abolishing general damages when certain conditions are
satisfied.
The UCCDA has been derisively dubbed by one attorney as the "Defaming

Publishers Relief Act." The pro-media defense bar bias of the UCCDA has been
implicitly acknowledged by Daniel M. Waggoner, former chair of the American
Bar Association's Forum on Communications Law.6 Waggoner states that "from
the perspective of the news media, the UCCDA should serve to markedly reduce

61. See RICHARD N. WINFIELD, LIBEL LITIGATION 995-1004 (1994) (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-389) [hereinafter WINFIELD, LIBEL
LITIGATION] (setting forth in its entirety the text of the Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act).
62. Lee Levine, A BriefHistory of the ProposedUniform Correctionor Clarificationof Defamation
Act, NEWSLETTER OF MEDIA LAW AND DEFAMATION TORTS CommIrEE (Tort and Insurance Practice Section
of the ABA), Winter 1994, at 5.
63. ABA, With Some Dissent, Adopts DefamationProposal,Media L. Rep. (BNA), Feb. 22, 1994, at
News Notes. The UCCDA is currently available for consideration in state legislatures and "will at first be
introduced in only a small number of states, perhaps a half dozen or less, beginning during the 1995 legislative
season." Henry R. Kaufman & Michael K. Cantwell, Potential Impact of the Uniform Correction or
Clarificationof Defamation Act on Damages,LIBEL DEF. RESOURCE CENTER BULL., July 31, 1994, at 80-81.
64. WINFIELD, LIBELLmrIGATION, supra note 61, at 996; see Lee J. Levine & Daniel M. Waggoner, The
Uniform Correctionor Clarificationof DefamationAct: Overview of the Act, COMM. LAw., Winter 1994, at
8, 9 (explaining that a plaintiff who fails to ask for a timely correction or clarification "is limited to the
recovery of 'provable economic loss,' i.e., those 'out-of-pocket' damages, such as lost wages or income,
actually caused by the alleged defamation").
65. ABA, With Some Dissent, Adopts Defamation Proposal,supra note 63, at News Notes (quoting
ABA delegate Stanley M. Brown of Bradford, N.H.).
66. Levine & Waggoner, supra note 64, at 8.
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the risks of defamation litigation"' 7 and that the UCCDA's "limitations on
recoverable damages offer all defamation defendants, including the news media,
a realistic opportunity to limit plaintiffs to the recovery of damages for provable
68

economic

loss.,

Before throwing up their hands on the issue of evaluating the intangible
nature of harm to reputation and adopting solutions that radically restrict recovery
of general damages, those involved in the libel reform process may be well
advised to consider the growing body of research and theory on reputational harm
from the discipline of communication. This research and theory suggests that
evaluating harm to reputation need not be such a speculative endeavor. Part II of
this article provides a brief introduction to this research.
I. COMMUNICATION RESEARCH ON REPUTATIONAL HARM: A PRIMER
In a 1987 article describing libel as communication phenomena, communication scholars Jeremy Cohen and Albert C. Gunther pose the following
question: Is communication research relevant to libel law?6 9 In answering their
own query in the affirmative, Cohen and Gunther state that communication

research and theory "can provide important considerations for those who determine the law through legislation and through jurisprudence., 70 Focusing on the
law's inability to deal with the complexity of concepts such as reputation, Cohen
and Gunther suggest that "research in communication brings us to a point at
which we may begin to operate with more precision to identify what we mean by
damage to reputation, and to identify the circumstances under which a communication may be reliably held to account for damage to reputation. ' 'T
Starting from the premise that "[t]he law makes assumptions about the
process and effects of communication," 72 Cohen and Gunther attack libel law's
subscription to the so-called hypodermic needle, or magic bullet, model of direct,
uniform, and powerful message effects.73 As Cohen and Gunther summarize the
legal model of libel and reputational harm:
In law, defamatory communications are causal and their effects are
direct. A negative communication is transmitted; it is received by others;

67.

Id. at I.

68. Id. It has also been predicted that the UCCDA will "tend to resolve many of the intractable
problems of open-ended damage exposure currently faced by libel defendants." Henry R. Kaufman & Michael
K. Cantwell, PotentialImpact of the Uniform Correctionor Clarificationof DefamationAct on Damages,
LIBEL DEF. RESOURCE CENTER BULL., July 31, 1994, at 80, 85.
69. Cohen & Gunther. supra note 29, at 29.
70. Id.

71.

Id.at 30.

72. Id. at 16.
73. Id.

1995/Impact of Denialof DefamatoryAllegations on ReputationalInjury

and the recipients form an attitude or belief, or change an attitude or
belief in a negative direction. The law conceptualizes the communication
model of libel as: DEFAMATION-RECEPTION-ATTITUDE
FORMATION [ATTITUDE CHANGE]. 74
Cohen and Gunther observe that communication research "offers little support for such a direct-effects hypothesis. 75 Instead, communication researchers
view communication as "a process containing a series of steps within complex
interactions among people.' 76 Cohen and Gunther identify a laundry list of communication concepts that serve as mediating variables or conditions that influence
the impact of a defamatory message on a person's reputation.7 7 Included among
the mediating communication variables identified by Cohen and Gunther are
audience context, source credibility, involvement, message repetition, prior
8
opinion, diversity of sources, accretion effect, and channel prestige.! While a
complete discussion of these concepts is beyond the scope of this article, the concept of source credibility is described in further detail below as an example of an
easy-to-understand communication variable that influences reputational harm.7 9
More recently, David McCraw addresses the same issue, analyzing social
science approaches for studying message effects within the context of libel law and
reputational harm.80 Borrowing heavily from Cohen and his colleagues and
incorporating theories from communication science, McCraw concludes that:

In any given case of alleged reputational harm, modem communicaiion
theory would suggest that a researcher explore the interaction of at least
four primary variables: (1) the pre-publication attitude of the audience

toward the plaintiff (positive or negative, long-held or recently developed); (2) the credibility ascribed by the audience to the publication
(trusted or distrusted, partisai or neutral); (3) the saliency of the subject
matter (its importance to the reader); and (4) the interpersonal interaction
(either reinforcing or counterfollowing exposure to the communication
81

acting the communication).

As noted above, source credibility is a communication concept of particular
relevance to libel law. It is briefly described here as an example of a concept that

74. Id. at 27.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id. at 27.
77. Id. at 28.
78. Id.
7% See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (describing the concept of source credibility).
80. David McCraw, How Do ReadersRead? Social Science and the Law ofLibel,41 CAT-. U. L. REV.
81,82 (1991).
81. Id.at9o-91.
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has, at least implicitly, been recognized by some courts in libel actions as relevant
for evaluating harm to reputation.
Perceived or ascribed source credibility is usually defined as a combination of
the trustworthiness (motive to speak honestly) and the expertise (knowledge on the
topic) of the source of a message.82 In general, the more credible the source to
which an argument or information is identified or linked, the more influential that
argumenfor information is likely to be on the receiver of the message. 83Cohen and
Gunther, linking source credibility to libel law, suggest that "the damage resulting
from a defamation may vary substantially with varying credibility, or ascribed
credibility, of the source. Such findings suggest differential effects of 'a message
when it appears in The New York Times versus supermarket tabloids."
In terms of libel law, there are several relevant layers of source credibility that
may influence reputational harm. In particular, four sources that may be influential
include: (1) the publication in which the defamatory statement was published
(publicationcredibility); (2) the writer or reporter under whose byline appeared
the story containing the defamatory statement (reportercredibility);(3) the person
or persons to whom the defamatory statement is directly attributed within the story
(attributed-speakercredibility); and (4) the groups or organizations that are
associated or identified with the attributed-speaker (affiliated-groupcredibility).
In summary, multiple layers of source credibility may be relevant in evaluating
reputational harm.
Source credibility was implicitly recognized in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc.8 Judge Alex Kozinski, in his opinion for the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit on remand from the United States Supreme Court,86 dropped a
footnote that included the following statement: Readers of reputable magazines such as The New Yorker are far more
likely to trust the verbatim accuracy of the stories they read than are the
readers of the supermarket tabloids or even daily newspapers, where they
understand the inherent limitations of the fact-finding process. The harm
inflicted by a misstatement in a publication known for scrupulously
investigating the accuracy of its stories can be far more 87serious than a
similar misstatement in a publication not known to do so.

82. RICHARD E. PETY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, ATITUDES AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 62-65 (1981).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Cohen & Gunther, supra note 29, at 23.
960 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992).
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2419 (1991).
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 960 F.2d 896, 901-02 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992).

1995/Impactof Denial of DefamatoryAllegations on ReputationalInjury
At the heart of Kozinski's statement lies the concept of source credibility, and,
in particular, publication credibility. Kozinski recognizes that the perceived
credibility of a publication may influence the extent of reputational harm caused
by statements appearing in that publication. Unfortunately, the standard jury instructions for general damages in California, adopted in the first trial88 in that case,
make no reference, directly or indirectly, to the concept of source credibility! 9
More recently, in Gifford v. National Enquirer,Inc.,90a libel case brought by

TV talk show hostess Kathie Lee Gifford and her husband, former football star
and current sports commentator Frank Gifford, against the publisher of presumably the type of "supermarket tabloid '9 ' to which Judge Kozinski's statement in
Masson makes reference, the court stated:
Although the article allegedly calls Plaintiffs' practices "shocking,"
"controversial," and "high-tech extremes," such sensationalization is no
doubt immediately discounted by readers. This Court can take judicial
notice of the fact that one who picks up a National Enquirer does so with
immediate caution that what they [sic] read is in large part rhetorical
hyperbole. 92
As with the statement by Judge Kozinski in Masson, the court in Gifford
implicitly is acknowledging that source credibility may be a valuable concept to
jurors evaluating reputational harm. Source credibility is only one of many variables studied by communication research that may influence the amount of reputational harm caused by a given defamatory message.9 3
In summary, communication research and theory suggest that there are many
variables that may influence the amount of harm to reputation caused by a defamatory message. Such concepts may be beneficial to jurors in libel trials. As communication researchers Cohen, Mutz, Price, and Gunther 94 stated in a 1988 article
linking communication science and reputational harm, libel jurors "reach decisions
[about reputational harm] based on their perceptions of the effects of a negative

communication on a community's opinion of a libel plaintiff."9'5

88. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (describing
the results of the first jury trial in the case).
89. See BAlI No. 7.10 (1992 Rev.) (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the jury instruction for general
damages in libel and slander actions in California).
90. 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1016 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
91. Masson, 960 F.2d at 901-02 n.5 (1992).
92. Gifford v. National Enquirer, Inc., 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1016, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
93. See Cohen & Gunther, supranote 29, at 28.
94. Jeremy Cohen et al., PerceivedImpactof Defamation: An Experiment on Third-PersonEffects, 52
PUB. OPINIONQ. 161 (1988).

95.

Id. at 162.
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Im. THE EXPERIMENT

This experiment was designed to examine the potential impact of denial of

defamatory allegations-including both a brief, single-sentence statement of denial
and a more lengthy, repetitious statement of denial-on reputational harm. Its
theoretical underpinnings rest in communication research on one-sided versus twosided messages and message repetition. 6 Ultimately, if a denial of defamatory
charges, published within the same article containing those allegations, proves to
reduce reputational harm caused by that article, this finding may provide jurors
with better guidance on the now-difficult task of evaluating reputational harm.
Section A provides a brief overview of the experiment, including its procedures and results. Section A may provide a sufficient description of the experiment for readers less interested in the experimental details, such as statistical procedures and tests, and those readers less familiar or concerned with experimental
methodology.

96. See Cohen & Gunther, supra note 29, at 25. Cohen and Gunther suggest that communication
research on one-sided versus two-sided messages may be relevant to the issue of reputational harm. Id. This
body of research deals primarily with the so-called inoculation effect. Id. As Cohen and Gunther state, research
on the inoculation effect suggests that "subjects who had 'heard both sides' on an issue were significantly less
affected by subsequent messages. Thus the effects of defamatory messages are likely to differ depending on
what other information or argument has been aired on the subject." Id.
As Cohen and Gunther note, research on one-sided versus two-sided messages suggests that the presence
of other information may mitigate the impact of a defamatory statement on a person's reputation. In the context
of a libel dispute, the other information may include a denial of the defamatory allegations. This study focuses
on the difference between a one-sided and a two-sided message and the immediate persuasive impact of that
message on a person's reputation.
A newspaper or magazine article at issue in a libel suit may be one-sided or two-sided. It may contain
only defamatory allegations (one-sided message), or it also may include a response to those allegations in the
form of a denial by the defamed individual (two-sided message). The inoculation effect would suggest that
readers of a two-sided article defaming a plaintiff may be less affected by this article than readers of a onesided defamatory article. This, in turn, would suggest that less reputational harm would be caused by a twosided defamatory article.
Another relevant factor that Cohen and Gunther suggest may mediate reputational harm is message
repetition. Id. at 28. Research on message repetition suggests that the amount and persistency of persuasive
impact of a message "increases for the first several repetitions." William McGuire, Attitudes and Attitude
Change, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 233, 274 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1985). As
applied to the issue of reputational harm, this suggests that a repeateddenial of defamatory allegations by an
allegedly defamed person may be more persuasive in mitigating reputational harm caused by those allegations
than a single statement of denial. In other words, a brief, one-sentence denial of defamatory allegations may
be less effective in mitigating reputational harm when compared with a more lengthy, repetitious statement of
denial by a defamed individual. After three or four repetitions, however further repetitions of a message may
decrease its impact. Id. Thus, there may be some danger that a denial may become too repetitious to be
effective in mitigating reputational harm.
When considered with the literature on one-sided and two-sided messages, the research on message
repetition suggests that a defamatory article containing a repeated statement of denial-one limited to three
or four repetitions of a denial-may reduce reputational harm more than a one-sided message devoid of any
denial by the defamed individual or even a two-sided message that includes only a brief, single-sentence
statement of denial.
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The experimental hypotheses (the predictions of the results) are set forth in
Section B, while Section C describes the subjects who participated in the
experiment, and Section D provides a step-by-step analysis of the experimental
procedures. Section E includes an overview of the data analysis, including the
statistical tests that were conducted on the gathered data. A detailed description of
the results of the experiment is set forth below in Section F.
A. Overview
A between-subjects, before-and-after treatment design was used for this
experiment.
In brief, each subject, or participant, in the experiment was initially tested for
his or her opinion about a real-life individual. This represented the "before" (or
"baseline") measure of opinion about the individual.
Each subject later read one of three nearly identical versions of a realisticappearing, simulated newspaper article containing defamatory accusations of
wrongdoing against that same individual. One version of the article included no
denial of those allegations by the defamed individual (No Denialcondition), while
a second version, in all other aspects like the first, included a one-sentence statement of denial by the defamed individual (BriefDenialcondition). A third version
included a lengthy, repeated statement of denial (Repeated Denial condition).
Together, these articles represented the stimulus, or independent variable, that was
manipulated in this experiment, and that was predicted to influence participants'
opinions about the defamed individual. Each version of the article may be thought
of as a different experimental "condition."
After reading one of the three versions of the article, each subject was then retested for his or her opinion about the defamed individual. This represented the
"re-test" (or "after") measure of opinion.
The average change in opinion about the individual--determined by comparing the before and after measures of opinion-was then calculated for subjects
in each of the three conditions. In other words, the average change of opinion was
determined for subjects who read the No Denial version of the article, the Brief
Denialversion, and the Repeated Denialversion. This allowed comparisons to be
made about the effectiveness of each form of denial in mitigating reputational.
harm.
The average change in opinion about the individual was the operational
measure of--or the indicator employed in the experiment to represent-harm to
reputation caused by each version of the article. In other words, harm to reputation
was measured, or operationalized, as subjects' opinion change, in the negative
direction, toward the defamed individual subsequent to reading one of the three

versions of the defamatory article. As described in Part I of this article, harm to
reputation is often manifested in opinion change about an individual.
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The results provide initial, tentative support for the conclusion that the
presence of a denial-in particular, a repeated statemenf of denial-within an
article containing defamatory allegations may be effective in mitigating reputational harm. In this experiment, the presence of a repeated statement of denial,
embedded in a defamatory article, resulted in significantly less harm to reputation
when compared to the same defamatory article devoid of any form of denial. In
other words, the Repeated Denialversion of the article caused a statistically significant lesser amount of opinion change about the individual when compared to the
No Denial version (t = 3.18, p < .01). In addition, the presence of a repeated

statement of denial (Repeated Denial) resulted in less reputational harm when
compared to the same article with the presence of only a single statement of denial
(BriefDenial), although this difference was not statistically significant (t = 1.60,
p = .06).
B. Hypotheses

Based on the communication research on one-sided versus two-sided messages
and message repetition, 97 and in consideration of the legal assumption of the
United States Supreme Court that a statement of denial may reduce reputational
harm,98 the following hypotheses are advanced. For each hypothesis, the hypothesized direction of opinion change subsequent to reading a defamatory article in
any of the three experimental conditions-No Denial, Brief Denial, Repeated

Denial-is negative because all versions of the article contained defamatory
accusations to which the subjects had never previously been exposed. As the
hypotheses below indicate, it was anticipated that the greatest opinion change in
the negative direction would occur in the No Denialcondition, with a lesser level
of opinion change occurring in the Brief Denial condition and a still smaller
amount of opinion change occurring in the Repeated Denialcondition.
1.

FirstHypothesis

The presence of a repeated statement of denial of libelous allegations,
published within the same article containing those allegations, will result in less
reputational harm to the defamed individual when compared to the same article
without any denial by the defamed individual.

97.
98.

See supranote 96.
See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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2. Second Hypothesis
The presence of a brief, single statement of denial of libelous allegations,
published within the same article containing those allegations, will result in less
reputational harm to the defamed individual when compared to the same article
without any denial by the defamed individual.
3. ThirdHypothesis
The presence of a repeated statement of denial of libelous allegations,
published within the same article containing those allegations, will result in less
reputational harm to the defamed individual when compared to the same article
containing a brief, single statement of denial.
C. Subjects
Seventy-three university students (sixty-two undergraduate and eleven
graduate students) participated in the experiment. They were recruited from an
introductory level communication class. Students received class credit simply for
arriving at the testing site (actual participation in the experiment was not required
to receive credit).
D. Procedure
This section provides a step-by-step account of the procedures employed in
this experiment.
Administration took place over a ten-day period in May, 1994. Subjects
signed up to participate during one of a number of twenty-minute time slots
available on three of those ten days. Upon arrival at the testing location, subjects
were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions-No Denial,
Brief Denial,or Repeated Denial--described below. They were assured that their
participation was voluntary and that response anonymity would be preserved.
Subjects were then informed that the researchers were interested in their opinions
about a number of prominent individuals and that during the course of the study
they would be asked to read two articles that appeared earlier that week in local
newspapers.
1. Baseline Measure of Opinion
All subjects then completed a questionnaire that provided a baseline-or
before-stimulus-measure of each subject's opinion about twenty prominent
individuals. These individuals included a number of officials associated with the
university that the subjects attended, as well as national and regional political

Vol. 26/PacificLaw Journal
figures such as President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and
former Secretary of State George Schultz.
Near the middle of the list was the name of one university official who was the
subject of the fictitious defamatory article that was the focus of this study. This
official was the only individual named on the questionnaire with whom the
researchers were concerned. The other individuals were simply listed so that the
purpose of the experiment would be masked.
This baseline opinion measure questionnaire asked subjects to respond to the
question, "What is your impression of [name of individual]?" for each of the
twenty named individuals. The question utilized a thirteen-point continuous scale
ranging from "Extremely Negative" to "Extremely Positive." In other words, each

participant in tfie experiment could give his or her opinion of each individual listed
on the questionnaire on any one of thirteen marks, with the lowest mark designated
as "Extremely Negative" and the highest mark designated as "Extremely Positive."
A similar question and response scale was previously used by communication
researchers Cohen et al. to evaluate subjects' opinions about a fictitious individual
in a communication experiment about whether statements of fact or opinion cause
greater reputational harm. 9
2. DistractionArticle
After completing this initial questionnaire, all subjects read the same
"distraction" stimulus-a copy of a then-recent article from a major local
newspaper about President Clinton's Haiti policy. The names of several of the
individuals identified in this article-President Clinton and Warren Christopher,
for instance-had previously appeared in the questionnaire. This article was
dubbed a distraction stimulus because its only use, for this experiment, was to
guard against subjects guessing the purpose of the experiment. In other words, the
intent of separating, or distancing, the initial baseline measure of opinion about the
one university official with whom the researchers were concerned from a later
article about that same official with the intervening article about President
Clinton's Haiti policy was to prevent subjects from guessing the purpose of the
experiment.
3. Defamatory Article
After reading the distraction article about President Clinton's Haiti policy,
each subject read one of three versions of a simulated newspaper article, created
solely for purposes of the experiment, that contained fabricated defamatory

99. Jeremy Cohen, et al., Experimental Test of Some Notions of the Fact/Opinion Distinction in Libel,
66 JOURNALISM Q. 11, 15 (1989).

1995/Impactof Denial ofDefamatory Allegations on ReputationalInjury
allegations of wrongdoing against the university official with whom the researchers were concerned. As noted above, each subject had previously given his or her
opinion about this individual on the baseline measure of opinion.
Each of the three versions of the article would likely be considered defamatory
because each imputed to the individual wrongdoing in a business, professional,
and occupational capacity. 1°0 Each version contained the exact same defamatory
allegations. In particular, each article began by stating that the university official
had told members of a budget advisory committee-of which the official was
identified as being in charge-that the university's political science department
faced "payback time" in the next round of budget cuts.
Each version of the article then quoted the university official as stating, at the
conclusion of a budget committee meeting, that: "I'm tired of the Clinton
Administration siphoning off our professors, taking them back to Washington. It's
payback time for the political science department when we make the next round
of departmental cuts."
All three versions of the article also noted that, prior to becoming a university
official, the individual had served as an advisor to a Republican administration in
Washington, D.C.
Each version of the article also stated that the university official "did not
elaborate on the extent of the cuts that the department would face, or how the cuts
would be made without arousing suspicion among others in the university."
All versions of the article also reported that one member of the committee had
informed the reporter about the university official's alleged comments, and that the
reporter had confirmed with a second committee member that the official had

made the remarks. The names of the committee members were unidentified in the
article, as it stated that each had requested anonymity. The committee, according
to the article, consisted of "several prominent [local] business persons and
[university] alumni."
The researchers decided to use two sources-rather than one-to attribute the
comments to the university official because the researchers were concerned that
a single, anonymous s6urce might not appear credible to readers. The article
further provided context, explaining how the university was "engaged in an
arduous-and sometimes acrimonious-budget-cutting process" in which the
university official had a "prominent role" that at times had earned the official "the
wrath of student and faculty groups."
Efforts were made to give the article the appearance that it came from a real
newspaper and that its content was plausible. To this end, the story was set in the
same type style and point size as that used by a major local newspaper, and the
fictitious byline identified the reporter as a staff writer for that newspaper.

100. CAL CIV. CODE § 46 (West 1982); see id (defining slander as an orally entered false publication).

Vol. 26/PacificLaw Journal

In addition, at the time the experiment was conducted, the university in
question was undergoing a severe budget-cutting process. Furthermore, the official
in question was a key decision maker in the budget-cutting process. While the budget advisory committee was fabricated by the researchers, its ostensible existence
and mission thus appeared plausible. Furthermore, several university professors
had indeed left to join the Clinton Administration, and the university official in
question had, in fact, served as an advisor to a Republican administration.
4. Differences Between the No Denial, Brief Denial, and Repeated
Denial Versions of the DefamatoryArticle
In the No Denial version of the story, no response or comment from the
university official was given to the remarks.
A second version of the story served as the Brief Denial condition. It was
identical to the No Denial version in all aspects except that it contained the following additional paragraph:
When questioned last night by telephone at home, [the official] denied the
accusations.
Finally, a third version of the article served as the Repeated Denialcondition.
This article, like the BriefDenialcondition, was identical to the No Denialcondition, with the exception that it included the following paragraph:
When questioned last night by telephone, [the official] denied the
allegations, calling them "out and out lies by members of the committee

who apparently are not pleased with the efforts we have been making. I'm
offended that anyone would even suggest that this process is not
proceeding in a fair and honest manner. Yes, difficult decisions have been
made, but I can assure you that my past connections to Washington have
in no way whatsoever influenced the budget cutting process."
This paragraph was chosen to represent the Repeated Denialcondition because
it follows up an initial denial---"[the official] denied the allegations"--with the
official repeating, in a variety of ways, the contention that the statements are false.
Each of the three statements that follows this initial statement of denial is simply
a denial-in different language-of the allegations of wrongdoing.
5. Re-Measure (orAfter-Measure) of Opinion
After subjects completed reading one of the three versions of the article about
the university official's alleged remarks, they were asked to complete a second
questionnaire designed to serve as the retest (or "after-stimulus") measure of
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opinions about the official. This measure utilized the same question format and
response scale as the initial measure. As in the first questionnaire, the university
official's name appeared near the middle of the names on this questionnaire. No
new names were added to the list.
6. Debriefingand Explanationof Experiment
Upon completion of the retest questionnaire, subjects were debriefed about the
nature of the experiment. The fabrication of the stimulus article about the university official was explained. An assurance that the entire scenario described in
the "article" was false was read aloud to each subject by the test administrators. In
addition, subjects read a brief statement describing the falsity of the article about
the university official. The written debriefing statement provided in relevant part
that all versions of the article were:
completely FABRICATED-the substance and allegations within the
articles were created solely for purposes of this study. In no way
whatsoever were the allegations even made-we created them only for the
purposes of this study.
Each subject also signed and dated a statement acknowledging that he or she now
understood that the story just read was "not a real article and that it was created
solely for purposes of this experiment."
E. Analysis of Data
Of the seventy-three participating subjects, seven were removed from the data
analysis. Four subjects gave the university official in question the lowest possible
rating on the initial questionnaire that provided the baseline measure of opinion;
for these subjects, the questionnaire used to measure opinion change would be
unable to measure any opinion change in the hypothesized negative direction. Two
other subjects informed the researchers that they did not know who the official was
before reading the article, and thus they did not complete the baseline opinion
measure.. Finally, the results of one subject were removed because the subject
proved to be an outlier, attributing a negative change in opinion toward the official
a full twenty-five percent higher than the next closest respondent. When these
subjects were removed, a total of twenty-six subjects remained in the No Denial
condition, twenty were left in the BriefDenial condition, and eighteen remained
in the RepeatedDenial condition.
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1. StatisticalProceduresand Tests
The mean--or average--opinion about the official in each condition, both
before and after the administration of the defamatory article, was computed for
each of the three conditions (the three versions of the article). An analysis of
variance procedure was run comparing the mean baseline (or "before") measure
of opinion in each of these conditions to test whether the researchers' random
assignment of subjects to the three experimental conditions was successful.
The mean opinion change-the average difference between the before and
after measures of opinion-in each condition was then calculated. A t-test procedure was run that compares the before and after means in each condition to
determine if the change in opinion between the before and after conditions was
statistically significant.
To test the three hypotheses introduced above in section B, a series of t-tests
was run, comparing mean opinion change in the three experimental conditions.
One-tail probabilities for the differences between mean opinion changes were calculated because the researchers hypothesized that the direction of opinion change
in each condition would be negative.
Finally, a hierarchical multiple regression was performed to test the significance of the group conditions in predicting mean level of opinion about the
defamed individual after reading the defamatory article. The baseline or "before"
measure of mean opinion was the independent variable entered on the first step of

the regression procedure, while the group or experimental condition measure was
entered on the second step.
F. Results
Table 1 below reports, for subjects in each of the three experimental
conditions, the average opinion of the university official in question before reading
the defamatory article (Mean at Time 1), the average opinion of that official after
reading the defamatory article (Mean at Time 2), the averagechange ordifference
in opinion after reading the defamatory article, and the t-value for the difference
between the before and after measures which relates to whether the change was
statistically significant.
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Table 1
Before and After Differences in Opinion
Mean at
Time I
(Before)

Mean at
Time 2
(After)

Mean Change
Between
T1 and 72

t-value

No Denial
(N=26)

7.88

6.00

-1.88

5.64***

BriefDenial
(N=20)

8.25

7.15

-1.10

2.92**

RepeatedDenial
7.72
(N=18)
**p <.01 *** p <.001

7.50

-0.22

Experiment
Condition

.55

The figures in Table 1 reveal that for subjects in each condition, the hypothesized direction of opinion change-negative-toward the university official
after reading the defamatory article was confirmed. As hypothesized, the beforeand-after change in the No Denial condition was the greatest and the most
significant, followed by the BriefDenialcondition and finally the Repeated Denial
condition. This indicates that the greatest amount of reputational harm, as indicated by opinion change, about the university official occurred for those subjects
who read the No Denial version of the story, while the least amount of reputational
harm occurred in the Repeated Denialcondition.
The analysis of variance procedure comparing the means of the baseline or
"before-stimulus" measure of opinion in each of the three conditions revealed that

the initial differences between the three groups were not significant (F = .20, p =
.82), suggesting that the random assignment of subjects to the three conditions was
successful.
The first research hypothesis-that subjects in the Repeated Denialcondition
would experience significantly less change in opinion in the negative direction
toward the university official when compared to those subjects in the No Denial
condition-was confirmed. The mean change of opinion in the hypothesized
negative direction in the Repeated Denial condition (M = -.22) was significantly
less than that in the No Denial condition (M = -1.88) (t = 3.18, p <.01). This suggests that significantly less reputational harm may be inflicted by an article that
contains repeated denials of defamatory allegations than by an otherwise similar
article devoid of any denial of the charges.
The second research hypothesis-that subjects in the BriefDenial condition
would experience significantly less change in opinion in a negative direction
toward the official when compared to those subjects in the No Denial condi-
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tion-was nearly confirmed. While the mean change in opinion in the BriefDenial
condition (M = -1.10) was less than that in the No Denial condition (M = -1.88),
the difference was not statistically significant in the hypothesized direction (t =
1.56, p = .06). With an increase in the number of subjects in future replications of
this experiment, however, statistical significance may be achieved.
The third hypothesis-that subjects in the Repeated Denialcondition would
experience significantly less change in opinion in a negative direction toward the
official when compared to those subjects in the Brief Denial condition-was also
nearly confirmed. While the mean change in opinion in a negative direction in the
Repeated Denial condition (M = -.22) was less than that of the mean change in
opinion in the Brief Denial condition (M = -1.10), this difference was not
statistically significant (t = 1.60, p = .06). As with the results of the second
research hypothesis, an increase in the number of subjects in future replications
might result in statistical significance.
The results of the hierarchical multiple regression procedure-in which the
"'after-stimulus" measure of opinion (the measure of opinion of the defamed
official subsequent to reading the defamatory article) was the dependent variable,
the baseline or "before" measure of opinion was entered as the first independent
variable, and group condition was entered as the second independent variable-are
set forth below in Table 2. As this table suggests, the group condition predicts
approximately five percent of the variance in the "after-stimulus" measure of
opinion, a statistically significant amount (p < .01). Such significance supports the
primary research hypothesis that the presence of a denial-in particular, a
RepeatedDenial-may affect reputational harm.

Table 2
Hierarchical Multiple Regression:

Predictors of "After-Stimulus" Measure of Opinion
Step Entered

Beta Coefficient
(Equation One)

Beta Coefficient
(Equation Two)

Mean at TI
(Baseline Measure
of Opinion)

1

.81

.81

Group Condition

2

Total R-Square
Incremental
R-Square Change
** p <.01

.22
.66

.71
.05**
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CONCLUSION

This article presents one experiment that takes an interdisciplinary approach
to the legal issue of evaluating harm to reputation caused by defamatory
allegations. The results suggest that when presented by a reporter with a chance
to make a denial of defamatory allegations, an individual would be well-advised
to make the most of the opportunity. In particular, the findings indicate that when
a defamed individual makes a Repeated Denial of such allegations, within the
same article containing those allegations, less opinion change in the negative direction about the individual-and, concomitantly, less harm to reputation-occurs
than when the individual makes No Denial. In addition, the results provide
somewhat weaker support for the conclusion that a repeated statement of denial
may be more effective in reducing reputational harm than a simple, single
statemefit of denial. Taken as a whole, the findings lend tentative credence to the
United States Supreme Court's assumption that the so-called "self-help" remedy
alternative to filing a libel action-an out-of-court denial "to contradict the
lie"""-may be effective in mitigating reputational harm.
Clearly, however, the results of one controlled experiment, conducted on one
group of college students (not representative of the general public), do not, to paraphrase First Amendment theorist Alexander Meiklejohn, give those who practice
libel law or those who study reputational harm from a communication perspective,
another occasion for dancing in the streets. 0 2 One experiment does not a general

principle make. Future replications of this experiment are obviously called for, and
other manipulations within the framework should be studied before any generalizations sufficient to withstand judicial scrutiny can be made. In particular, the
subjects in this experiment were college students, a group clearly not representative of the general public. Thus, future replications should attempt to randomly
sample from the general population, and not focus on college students.
Communication research on the ordering of message contents may also be
relevant for future replications. This might include manipulating the physical
proximity of the denial statement in its relation to the defamatory allegations. In
other words, the location of the denial-where it physically appears-in an article
may influence its effectiveness in mitigating reputational harm. As communication
scholars Hovland, Janis, and Kelley'0 3 noted in early communication research on
the issues of persuasion and attitude change, the manner of organization of
arguments "will influence what the audience thinks about during exposure to a

101. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
102. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REV. 191,221 n.125 (1964).
103. CARL I.HoVLAND, ET.AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953).
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communication and hence may have a marked effect on its acceptance or
rejection. ' 4
Further research also should manipulate the type of defamatory allegations.
While the allegations in this experiment impugned the professional and occupational capacity of an individual, other types of defamatory allegations may impute
to a person participation in a crime, sexual unchastity, or the existence of loathsome disease, each of which typically is slanderous per se.105 It remains to be seen
whether denial of these types of allegations would be effective in reducing
reputational harm.
In addition, from a theoretical perspective, much work must be done. In
particular, one major question that must be theorized is: Was the Repeated Denial
condition more effective in reducing reputational harm simply because it was
longer than the Brief Denial condition or because the statements included in the
RepeatedDenial condition were, substantively, more persuasive? It is possible that
the Repeated Denial condition was more effective because its length caught the
attention of the reader, while the BriefDenialversion was more easily passed over
by the reader.
The current experiment, coupled with the brief overview of other communication research on libel law theory presented here, does suggest, however, that the
law may benefit from further communication research, much in the way that the
discipline of psychology attempts to provide context and social facts for various
legal issues. 106 Evaluating harm to a person's reputation is a tricky task. While the
"[1]aw is not lame without social science research,"10 7 the results of future
communication research and theory, perhaps in the form of revised jury

instructions on reputational harm, may someday assist the law. While the state of
knowledge in communication research may not be up to this task at this stage,
those now currently attempting to reform libel law may want to consider research
from the discipline of communication in developing future proposals. There are
variables studied in the discipline of communication that may help take some of
the theories and the guesswork described by Dobbs out of evaluating harm to
1
reputation. 08
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